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Abstract
In this lecture, we use Schumpeterian growth theory, where growth comes from quality-
improving innovations, to elaborate a theory of growth policy and to explain the growth gap
between Europe and the US. Our theoretical apparatus systematizes the case-by-case approach
to growth policy design. The emphasis is on three policy areas that are potentially relevant
for growth in Europe, namely: competition and entry, education, and macropolicy. We argue
that higher entry and exit (higher ﬁrm turnover) and increased emphasis on higher education
are more growth-enhancing in countries that are closer to the technological frontier. We also
argue that countercyclical budgetary policies are more growth-enhancing in countries with
lower ﬁnancial development. The analysis thus points to important interaction effects between
policies and state variables, such as distance to frontier or ﬁnancial development, in growth
regressions. Finally, we argue that the other endogenous growth models, namely the AK and
productvarietymodels,failtoaccountfortheevidenceontherelationshipbetweencompetition,
education,volatility,andgrowth,andconsequentlycannotdeliverrelevantpolicyprescriptions
in the three areas we consider. (JEL: O20, O30, O40)
1. Introduction
Suppose you are sitting on a policy panel and asked to analyze the reasons for
the persistently slow growth in the EU (less than 2% a year against 3% in the US
between 1995 and 2000) and come up with adequate policy recommendations.
Or suppose you are asked to explain why Latin America has been leapfrogged by
South-East Asia over the past thirty years, and is currently stagnating at a growth
rate of 0.2% for the past ﬁve years. Your immediate reﬂex will probably be to dig
intoexistingmacroeconomictextbookstoseewhethertheyhaveanythingtooffer
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“ready-to-wear” that would help you explain the European and Latin American
stagnations and ﬁnd solutions to them.
However,disappointingly,therearen’tmanyready-to-wearitemsyoucanput
in your bag from that search. The neo-classical or AK models can hardly explain
why the US has been growing faster than Europe since the mid-1990s, given that
the average European saving rate over the past decade has been higher than the
USrate,andmoreimportantlygiventhattheaverageEuropeancapital-laborratio
has remained higher than the US ratio and has not noticeably decreased over that
period. And at ﬁrst sight the standard textbook innovation-based model(s) cannot
account for the recent growth gap between Europe and the US, given that the
property rights and innovation subsidies stressed by these models are reasonably
well established in Europe, and that Europe invests almost as large a fraction of
GDP on R&D as the US (2% vs. 2.5%). Moreover, these models do not seem
to explain why European labor productivity growth was much higher than US
growth during the 1960s and 1970s (3.5% vs. 1.4% on average during the 1970s),
given that R&D investments were higher in the US than Europe throughout this
period.
After such a disappointing search for textbook recipes, one alternative is to
turn directly to policy specialists. In particular, one may look at Dani Rodrik’s
(forthcoming) chapter on “Growth Strategies” or at Bill Easterly’s (forthcom-
ing) chapter on “National Policies and Economic Growth: A Reappraisal,” both
written for the forthcoming Handbook of Economic Growth. From Dani Rodrik’s
chapter one gets the important insight that “ﬁrst-order economic principles (such
as) protection of property rights…(and)…appropriate incentives…do not map
into unique policy packages” and that Asian countries have done quite well with-
out following the policy model commonly known as “Washington consensus”
(and which consists of combining full market liberalization, macroeconomic sta-
bilization, and privatization). One also learns that the policy challenge is not only
to initiate growth, but also to sustain it over the long run. However, the chap-
ter does not provide theoretical guidelines when it comes to choosing the policy
package that would be most appropriate for each particular country; the pol-
icy maker is advised to take a case-by-case approach and rely primarily on her
instinctsandcommonsense.Ontheotherhand,BillEasterly’schaptergivesmore
of a chance to theory, and more speciﬁcally on the AK approach, to analyze the
growtheffectofpolicyvariablessuchasinﬂation,budgetbalance,realovervalua-
tion, black market premium, ﬁnancial depth, and trade openness. However, when
going from theory to the empirics, Easterly ends up with the disappointing con-
clusion that once one excludes the big outliers from cross-country regressions,
one ﬁnds no signiﬁcant effect of policy on growth. Thus, although very bad poli-
cies are detrimental to growth, we lose any signiﬁcant effect of policy among the
more moderate countries. But very bad policies in turn are likely to result from
bad institutions, thus Easterly’s conclusion is that all what matters at the end is“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 271 — #3
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theexistenceofsoundbasicinstitutions.ButthosealreadyexistinEuropeandyet
the productivity gap between Europe and the US keeps on widening. And Latin
American countries like Mexico that have conformed for more than ﬁfteen years
with the Washington Consensus blueprint keep on stagnating.
In this Schumpeter lecture, we shall argue that growth theory is in fact useful
for analyzing growth policy, provided one uses an adequate growth paradigm.
We posit that Schumpeterian theory in which growth results from quality-
improving innovations, provides such a paradigm and can be developed into a
theory of the policy of growth. Unlike the other endogenous growth models,
namely the AK model and Romer’s product variety model, the Schumpeterian
paradigm provides a way to “systematize” the case-by-case approach advocated
by Rodrik, by pointing at key economic variables such as the country’s distance
to the technological frontier or its degree of ﬁnancial development, that should
affect the design of structural and macroeconomic policies aimed at fostering
growth.
The lecture is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy reviews the three main
endogenousgrowthparadigms:AK,theSchumpeterianframework,andtheprod-
uct variety model. The next sections discusses three areas in which good policy
can make a difference for growth, and in particular help overcome current Euro-
pean stagnation. Section 3 focuses on competition and entry, and in particular
explains why Europe would beneﬁt from a competition and labor market pol-
icy that does not only emphasize competition among incumbent ﬁrms but also
stresses the importance of entry, exit and mobility. Section 4 analyzes education,
and argues that growth in Europe would beneﬁt from devoting more resources to
higher education. Section 5 discusses the role and design of countercyclical bud-
getary policies. Section 6 concludes the lecture by revisiting the role of savings
in the growth process, in a way that questions the neo-classical and AK models
at their very heart and also suggests new policy avenues.
2. Three Paradigms for Analyzing Growth Policy
Toanalyzepoliciesforgrowth,oneneedsatheoreticalframeworkinwhichgrowth
isendogenous,thatis,dependsuponcharacteristicsoftheeconomicenvironment.
That framework must account for long-term technological progress and produc-
tivitygrowth,withoutwhichdiminishingmarginalproductivitywouldeventually
choke off all growth.
The ﬁrst version of endogenous growth theory was the so-called AK theory,
which did not make an explicit distinction between capital accumulation and
technological progress. In effect it just lumped together the physical and human
capital whose accumulation is studied by neoclassical theory with the intellectual
capital that is accumulated when technological progress is made. Indeed Lucas’s“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 272 — #4
272 Journal of the European Economic Association
(1988)inﬂuentialcontributionfollowedUzawa(1965)inexplicitlyassumingthat
human capital and technological knowledge were one and the same. When this
aggregate of different kinds of capital is accumulated there is no reason to think
that diminishing returns will drag its marginal product down to zero, because
part of that accumulation is the very technological progress needed to counteract
diminishing returns.
According to the AK paradigm, the way to sustain high growth rates is to
save a large fraction of GDP, some of which will ﬁnd its way into ﬁnancing
a higher rate of technological progress and will thus result in faster growth.
Thrift and capital accumulation are the keys, not novelty and innovation. AK
theory thus formalizes the ideas behind the World Bank consensus policies after
World War II, according to which the problem of economic development was
underaccumulation of capital and the cure was to subsidize and give aid to large
investment projects. The theory is in effect a retrospect attempt to rationalize
policies which by the 1990s were already known to have failed spectacularly in
the developing world (Easterly 2001, ch. 2), and in this lecture we will argue
that more generally the AK approach fails to make the case for growth policy
altogether.
The second wave of endogenous growth theory consists of so-called
innovation-based growth models, which themselves belong to two parallel
branches. One branch is the model of Romer (1990), according to which aggre-
gate productivity is a function of the degree of product variety. Innovation causes
productivity growth in the product-variety paradigm by creating new, but not
necessarily improved, varieties of products. This paradigm grew out of the new
theory of international trade, and emphasized the technology spillovers accord-
ing to which the productivity of resources devoted to developing new product
varieties was greater the greater the variety of products that have already been
developed.
The other branch of innovation-based theory, ﬁrst developed in our article1
and subsequently elaborated in our book,2 grew out of modern industrial orga-
nization theory, and is commonly referred to as “Schumpeterian” growth theory,
because it focuses on quality improving innovations that render old products
obsolete, and hence involves the force that Schumpeter called “creative destruc-
tion.” In this Schumpeter lecture we shall argue that the Schumpeterian paradigm
holds the best promise of delivering a systematic, integrated, and yet operational
framework for analyzing and developing context-dependent growth policies, of
the kind that can help putting a region like Europe back on a high growth path,
whereas the AK and the product variety paradigms fail to fully deliver on those
promises.
1. See Aghion and Howitt (1992).
2. See Aghion and Howitt (1998).“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 273 — #5
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2.1. The AK Paradigm
TheAKparadigmisneoclassicalgrowththeorywithoutdiminishingreturns.The
theory starts with an aggregate production function that is linear homogeneous
in the stock of capital:
Yt = AKt, (1)
withAaconstant.Outputisinturndividedbetweenconsumptionandinvestment:
Yt = Ct + It, (2)
and net investment is investment minus depreciation at the ﬁxed rate δ:
˙ Kt = It − δKt. (3)
Thus the growth rate of output is the same as the growth rate of capital, which in
turn depends on thrift.
In early versions of the theory,3 thrift is represented by a ﬁxed saving ratio:
s = 1 − Ct/Yt, in which case the economy’s growth rate is
g = sA− δ.
Alternatively, Romer’s (1986) version4 represented thrift as intertemporal utility
maximization à la Ramsey, in which a representative household maximizes
  ∞
0
e−ρt C1−σ
t
1 − σ
dt
subject to the production function (1), the law of motion (3), and an individual
version of the resource-balance constraint (2):
Yt = Ct + (1 − τ)It + Tt,
where τ is an investment subsidy (or tax, if negative) ﬁnanced by the lump-sum
tax T. The Euler equation implied by this problem determines immediately the
economy’s growth rate as
g =
˙ C
C
=
A
1−τ − δ − ρ
σ
.
An immediate implication of this model is that a higher saving rate s, or higher
investment-subsidyrateτ,encouragescapitalaccumulationandthereforegrowth.
3. See Frankel (1962).
4. See also King and Rebelo (1993).“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 274 — #6
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In multi-sector versions of the AK model, the production function (1) still
holds but it is recognized that Kt can be an aggregate of different kinds of
capital:
Kt = G(K1t,...,K nt),
with output divided between consumption and investment in the different kinds
of capital according to a production-possibility frontier
Yt = Ct + J( ˙ K1t + δ1K1t,..., ˙ Knt + δnKnt),
with G and J both being homogenous of degree one. The allocation of saving
across different kinds of capital can follow different patterns, but generally there
will be a growth-maximizing von Neumann ray. The rate of growth will depend
not only upon thrift but also upon the how the economy distributes its saving
across the different kinds of capital.
Note that AK theory constitutes a “one-size-ﬁts-all” approach to the growth
process. It applies equally to countries that are on the leading edge of the world
technology frontier and to countries that are far behind. Like the neoclassical
theory of Solow and Swan, it postulates a growth process that is independent
of developments in the rest of the world, except insofar as international trade
changes the conditions for capital accumulation.5 As we shall see in more detail,
the theory is not helpful in understanding how the institutions and policies that
were so successful in promoting growth immediately following World War II,
when Europe was far below the frontier, turned out to produce relatively poor
performance since the 1990s.
2.2. The Schumpeterian Paradigm
Schumpeterian theory begins with a production function speciﬁed at the industry
level:
Yit = A1−α
it Kα
it, 0 <α<1( 4 )
where Ait is a productivity parameter attached to the most recent technology
used in industry i at time t.In this equation, Kit represents the ﬂow of a unique
intermediate product used in this sector, each unit of which is produced one-
for-one by capital. Aggregate output is just the sum of the industry-speciﬁc
outputs Yit.
Each intermediate product is produced and sold exclusively by the most
recent innovator. A successful innovator in sector i improves the technology
5. See, for example, Acemoglu and Ventura (2002).“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 275 — #7
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parameterAit andisthusabletodisplacethepreviousinnovatorastheincumbent
intermediatemonopolistinthatsector,untildisplacedbythenextinnovator.Thus
the ﬁrst key implication that distinguishes the Schumpeterian paradigm from the
AK and product-variety models is that faster growth generally implies a higher
rate of ﬁrm turnover, because this process of creative destruction generates entry
of new innovators and exit of former innovators.
Although the theory focuses on individual industries and explicitly analyzes
the microeconomics of industrial competition, the assumption that all industries
are ex ante identical gives it a simple aggregate structure. In particular, it is easily
shown that aggregate output depends on the aggregate capital stock Kt according
to the Cobb–Douglas aggregate per-worker production function
Yt = A1−α
t Kα
t , (5)
where the labor-augmenting productivity factor At is just the unweighted sum
of the sector-speciﬁc Ait’s. As in neoclassical theory, the economy’s long-run
growth rate is given by the growth rate of At, which here depends endogenously
on the economy-wide rate of innovation.
There are two main inputs to innovation; namely, the private expenditures
made by the prospective innovator, and the stock of innovations that have already
been made by past innovators. The latter input constitutes the publicly available
stock of knowledge to which current innovators are hoping to add. The theory is
quite ﬂexible in modeling the contribution of past innovations. It encompasses
the case of an innovation that leapfrogs the best technology available before the
innovation, resulting in a new technology parameter Ait in the innovating sec-
tor i, which is some multiple γ of its pre-existing value. And it also encompasses
the case of an innovation that catches up to a global technology frontier ¯ At which
we typically take to represent the stock of global technological knowledge avail-
able to innovators in all sectors of all countries. In the former case the country is
making a leading-edge innovation that builds on and improves the leading-edge
technology in its industry. In the latter case the innovation is just implementing
technologies that have been developed elsewhere.6
For example, consider a country in which in any sector leading-edge innova-
tions take place at the frequency µn and implementation innovations take place
at the frequency µm. Then the change in the economy’s aggregate productivity
parameter At will be
At+1 − At = µn(γ − 1)At + µm( ¯ At − At),
6. This ﬂexibility of the Schumpeterian framework does not lead to a theory in which anything can
happen.Forexample,inthenextsectionwediscusscompetitionandentry.AsshowninAghionetal.
(2005a), the effect of competition on growth in the Schumpeterian paradigm is either monotonic or
inverted-U shaped, but cannot be of any other form. Similarly, the effect of entry at the frontier on
productivity growth is always more (and not less) positive in sectors initially closer to the frontier.“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 276 — #8
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and hence the growth rate will be
gt =
At+1 − At
At
= µn(γ − 1) + µm(a−1
t − 1), (6)
where
at = At/ ¯ At
is an inverse measure of “distance to the frontier.”
Thus, by taking into account that innovations can interact with each other in
different ways in different countries Schumpeterian theory provides a framework
in which the growth effects of various policies are highly context-dependent. In
particular, the Schumpeterian apparatus is well suited to analyze how a country’s
growth performance will vary with its proximity to the technological frontier at,
to what extent the country will tend to converge to that frontier, and what kinds
of policy changes are needed to sustain convergence as the country approaches
the frontier.
Wecouldtakethecriticalinnovationfrequenciesµm andµn thatdeterminea
country’s growth path as given, just as neoclassical theory often takes the critical
saving rate s as given. However, Schumpeterian theory goes deeper by deriving
these innovation frequencies endogenously from the proﬁt-maximization prob-
lem facing a prospective innovator, just as the Ramsey model endogenizes s by
deriving it from household utility maximization. This maximization problem and
its solution will typically depend upon institutional characteristics of the econ-
omy such as property rights protection and the ﬁnancial system, and also upon
government policy; moreover, the equilibrium intensity and mix of innovation
will often depend upon institutions and policies in a way that varies with the
country’s distance to the technological frontier a.
Equation (6) incorporates Gerschenkron’s “advantage of backwardness,”7 in
the sense that the further the country is behind the global technology frontier
(i.e., the smaller is at) the faster it will grow, given the frequency of implemen-
tation innovations. As in Gerschenkron’s analysis, the advantage arises from the
fact that implementation innovations allow the country to make larger quality
improvements the further it has fallen behind the frontier. As we shall see, this is
justoneofthewaysinwhichdistancetothefrontiercanaffectacountry’sgrowth
performance.
In addition, as stressed by Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2002) (hence-
forth, AAZ), growth equations like (6) make it quite natural to capture
Gerschenkron’s idea of “appropriate institutions.” Suppose indeed that the
institutions that favors implementation innovations (that is, that lead to ﬁrms
7. See Gerschenkron (1962).“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 277 — #9
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emphasizingµm attheexpenseofµn)arenotthesameasthosethatfavorleading-
edge innovations (that is, that encourage ﬁrms to focus on µn). Then, far from
thefrontieracountrywillmaximizegrowthbyfavoringinstitutionsthatfacilitate
implementation,howeverasitcatchesupwiththetechnologicalfrontier,tosustain
a high growth rate the country will have to shift from implementation-enhancing
institutions to innovation-enhancing institutions as the relative importance of
µn for growth is also increasing. As formally shown in AAZ, failure to oper-
ate such a shift can prevent a country from catching up with the frontier level
of per capita GDP, and Sapir et al. (2003) argued that this failure largely
explains why Europe stopped catching up with US per capita GDP since of the
mid-1970s.
Howaboutgrowthrates?Supposethattheglobalfrontiergrowsattheexoge-
nousrate ¯ g.8 Thenequation(6)impliesthatinthelongrunacountrythatengages
in implementation investments (with µm > 0) will ultimately converge to the
same growth rate as the world technology frontier. That is, the relative gap at that
separatesthiseconomyfromthetechnologyfrontierwillconvergeasymptotically
to the steady-state value
  a =
µm
¯ g + µm − µn(γ − 1)
, (7)
which is an increasing function of the domestic innovation rates and a decreasing
function of the global productivity growth rate. The economic force underlying
thisconvergenceingrowthratesisagainGerschenkron’sadvantageofbackward-
ness, according to which a country that is growing slower than the frontier rate ¯ g,
andwhichisthereforefallingfurtherbehindthefrontier,willthereforeexperience
an increase in its growth rate.
Now, can we explain why, since the mid 1990s, the EU is growing at a
lower rate than the US? A plausible story, which comes out naturally from the
previous discussion, is that the European economy caught up technologically
to the US following World War II but then its growth began to slow down
before the gap with the US had been closed because its policies and institu-
tions were not designed to optimize growth when close to the frontier. That
by itself would have resulted in a growth rate that fell down to that of the
US but no further. But then what happened was that the information technol-
ogy (IT) revolution resulted in a revival of ¯ g in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Because Europe was as not well placed as the US to beneﬁt from this techno-
logical revolution the result was a reversal of Europe’s approach to the frontier,
whichaccordswiththeSchumpeteriansteady-statecondition(7),andthefactthat
Europe is not adjusting its institutions in order to produce the growth maximizing
8. Howitt (2000) shows how the global growth rate can be endogenized as a function of innovation
rates in sectors and all countries.“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 278 — #10
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innovation policy acts as a delaying force on growth convergence towards
the US.9
2.3. The Product-variety Paradigm
The other branch of innovation-based growth theory is the product-variety
model of Romer10 (1990), which starts from a Ethier–Dixit–Stiglitz production
function11 of the form
Yt =
Nt  
0
Kα
itdi,
in which there are Nt different varieties of intermediate product. By symmetry,
the aggregate capital stock Kt will be divided up evenly among the Nt existing
varieties equally, which means we can re-express this production function as
Yt = N1−α
t Kα
t . (8)
According to (8), the degree of product variety Nt is the economy’s labor-
augmentingproductivityparameter,anditsgrowthrateistheeconomy’slong-run
growth rate of per-capita output. Product variety raises the economy’s production
potential in this theory because it allows a given capital stock to be spread over a
larger number of uses, each of which exhibits diminishing returns.
The driving force of long-run growth in the product-variety paradigm is
innovation, as in the Schumpeterian paradigm. In this case, however, innova-
tions do not generate better intermediate products, just more of them. Also, as
in the Schumpeterian model, the equilibrium R&D investment and innovation
rate result from a research arbitrage equation that equates the expected marginal
9. Endogenizing µm can also generate divergence in growth rates. For example, human capital
constraints as in Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), or credit constraints as in Aghion, Howitt, and
Mayer-Foulkes (2005), make the equilibrium value of µm increasing in a, which turns the growth
equation(6)intoanon-linearequation.Thatµm beincreasinginafollowsinturnfromtheassumption
that the cost of innovating is proportional to the frontier technology level that is put in place by the
innovation, (Ha and Howitt 2005 provide empirical support for this proportionality assumption),
whereas the ﬁrm’s investment is constrained to be proportional to current local productivity. Then,
countries very far from the frontier and/or with very low degrees of ﬁnancial development or of
human capital will tend to grow in the long run at a rate which is strictly lower than the frontier
growth rate ¯ g. However, our empirical analysis in this paper shows that this source of divergence
does not apply to EU countries.
10. The semi-endogenous model of Jones (1995), in which long-run economic growth depends
uniquely on the rate of population growth, might be thought of as a fourth paradigm, but it has
nothing useful role to say about growth policy, since it predicts that long-run growth is independent
of any policy that does not affect population growth. It does imply that innovation affects growth
during the transition to the long-run but in that context it behaves just like the product-variety model
that we discuss in this section.
11. See Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 279 — #11
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payoff from engaging in R&D to the marginal opportunity cost of R&D. But the
fact that there is just one kind of innovation, which always results in the same
kind of new product, means that the product-variety model is limited in its ability
to generate context-dependent growth, and is therefore of limited use for policy
makers in Europe.
In particular, the theory makes it very difﬁcult to talk about the notion of
a technology frontier and of a country’s distance to the frontier. Consequently,
it has little to say about how the kinds of policies appropriate for promoting
growth in countries near the world’s technology frontier may differ from those
appropriate in technological laggards, and thus to explain why Asia is growing
fast with policies that depart from the Washington consensus, or why Europe has
grown faster than the US during the ﬁrst three decades after World War II but not
thereafter.12
In addition, nothing in this model implies an important role for exit and
turnover of ﬁrms and workers; indeed, increased exit in this model can do noth-
ing but reduce the economy’s GDP, by reducing the variety variable Nt that
uniquely determines aggregate productivity according to the production func-
tion (8). As we shall argue in more details in Section 3, these latter implications
of the product variety model are inconsistent with an increasing number of recent
studies demonstrating that labor and product market mobility are key elements
of a growth-enhancing policy near the technological frontier.
3. Entry and Exit
So far, competition policy in Europe has emphasized competition among incum-
bent ﬁrms, but paid insufﬁcient attention to entry. Entry, as well as exit and
turnoverofﬁrms,aremoreimportantintheUnitedStatesthanEurope.Forexam-
ple, 50% of new pharmaceutical products are introduced by ﬁrms that are less
than 10 years old in the United States, versus only 10% in Europe. Similarly,
12% of the largest US ﬁrms by market capitalization at the end of the 1990s
had been founded less than 20 years before, against only 4% in Europe, and the
difference between US and Europe turnover rates is much bigger if one considers
the top 500 ﬁrms.
That the higher entry costs and lower degree of turnover in Europe compared
to the US are an important part of the explanation for the relatively disappointing
12. Forexample,Helpman(1993)usestheproduct-varietyapproachtoconstructa2-countrymodel
in which innovation takes place only in the North and imitation only in the South. But although
policies would then have different growth effects depending on whether implemented in the North
orSouth,thereisnothinginthisanalysisthatlinksagivencountry’spositionasimitatororinnovator
toanyproductivitygap;insteaditisjustassumedthatsomecountriescannotimitateandsomecannot
innovate. Thus there is nothing in the approach that would imply a change in appropriate institutions
or policies as the country closed the gap, let alone allow for one country to leapfrog another.“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 280 — #12
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European growth performance over the past decade has been shown in empirical
work by Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003). In this section we ﬁrst argue that the
Schumpeterian paradigm is well-suited to analyze the effects of entry and exit
on innovation and growth. We then provide evidence that is consistent with the
predictions of that paradigm and questions the other two models of endogenous
growth.
Thesectionisorganizedasfollows.Section3.2showshowtheSchumpeterian
paradigm can be used to analyze the effects of entry on innovation and growth,
and contrasts the predictions delivered by this paradigm with those delivered by
theothermodelsofendogenousgrowth.Section3.3presentsevidencesupporting
the Schumpeterian predictions. And Section 3.4 concludes.
3.1. Product-Market Competition among Incumbents
Like the product variety model, the Schumpeterian growth paradigm embodies
the “appropriability” effect, by which stricter competition policy may reduce
growth by reducing the post-innovation rents that reward a successful innova-
tor. However, the Schumpeterian paradigm naturally generates a counteracting
“escape competition” effect. That is, in duopoly industries where the two ﬁrms
have similar technological capabilities, although more intense competition low-
ers the post-innovation rents of an innovating ﬁrm, nevertheless it may lower the
rents of a non-innovating ﬁrm by even more. In such an industry, more competi-
tion thus raises the incremental proﬁts that a ﬁrm earns by innovating; in effect,
innovation is a means by which the ﬁrm can break away from the constraints of
intensecompetitionwithaclosetechnologicalrival. Lessintensecompetition,on
the other hand, would make it easier for the ﬁrm to earn proﬁts without having
to incur the expense of innovating. Thus more intense competition in “neck-and-
neck” industries can lead to higher innovation rates and hence faster productivity
growth.
This escape-competition effect is likely to be dominated by the appropri-
ability effect in unleveled industries, where one ﬁrm has a large technological
lead over its rival. The leader in such an industry will not be under intense
pressure to innovate regardless of the nature of competition policy. And the
laggard’s incentive to innovate, and therefore to catch up with the leader, may
be blunted by a more vigorous anti-trust policy whose main effect would be to
reduce the post-innovation proﬁt that the ﬁrm can earn from catching up. Thus
one important prediction of the Schumpeterian paradigm is that product market
competition should have a more positive effect on innovation and productivity
growthinindustrieswhereﬁrmsaremoreneck-and-neck.InAghion,Bloometal.
(2005)thispredictionistestedbyexaminingpatentingrateswithinapanelofUK
manufacturingﬁrmsovertheperiod1973–1992,andtheresultsaresummarizedin
Figure 1A.“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 281 — #13
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Figure 1A. Innovation and competition: The neck-and-neck split. The ﬁgure plots a measure of
competition on the x-axis again citation weighted patents on the y-axis. Each point represents
an industry-year. The circles show the exponential quadratic curve that is reported in column (2)
of Table I. The triangles show the exponential quadratic curve estimated only on neck-and-neck
industries that is reported in column (4) of Table III.
The ﬁgure shows that if we restrict the set of industries to those above the
median degree of neck-and-neckness, the upward sloping part of the inverted-U
relationship between competition and innovation is steeper than we consider the
whole sample of industries.13
The non-steady-state aspects of this theory may have something to say about
the recent slowdown of European growth relative to the US. That is, suppose
we think of the typical European industry as involving competition between a
European and a US ﬁrm. As others have observed, product-market competition
tends to be less intense in the Europe than in the US. But during the immediate
13. Theinverted-Ufeatureisexplainedbythefactthat,athighdegreesofcompetition,theincentive
to escape competition is so intense among neck-and-neck ﬁrms that industries quickly leave that
state, resulting in a steady-state distribution with very few industries being neck-and-neck; thus, the
overall effect of competition is the negative appropriability effect at work in unlevel industries; at
low degrees of competition however the incentive to escape competition is so blunted that industries
tend to remain for a long period in the neck-and-neck state, resulting in a steady-state distribution
with most industries being neck-and-neck, so that the overall effect of competition is the escape-
competition effect that dominates in those industries. The explicit micro structure of Schumpeterian
theory implies that these same predictions concerning a country’s growth rate and innovation rate
apply equally well to the growth rate and innovation rate of each industry within the country.“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 282 — #14
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post–World War II period the European ﬁrms were predominantly the technolog-
icallaggards,whoseinnovationrateswouldhavebeendiminishedbyveryintense
competition. Thus for some time the relatively non-competitive nature of Europe
was favorable to innovation and productivity-growth by European ﬁrms. How-
ever, as Europe approached closer to the global technological frontier, more and
more industries involved neck-and-neck competition between a European ﬁrm
and its US counterpart, and it is in this situation where European innovation and
growth were dampened by its non-competitive environment.
What we have here is an example of a phenomenon we explore in more
detail in the following section, namely that policies which promote rapid eco-
nomic growth when the economy is far from the world technology frontier may
work in the opposite direction once the country has approached close to the
frontier. As we shall see, this general phenomenon, which arises naturally in a
Schumpeterian setting, applies to all three of the policy areas explored in this
address.
Could one easily extend the product variety model in order to generate the
equivalent of our escape competition effect? Our answer is no, based on the
following considerations. First, the escape competition effect requires that inno-
vations be performed by incumbent ﬁrms with positive pre-innovation rents that
decrease more rapidly than post-innovation rents with competition. However,
the essence of the product variety model is that growth results from the entry
of new intermediate goods, and therefore by deﬁnition the innovators have pre-
innovation rents equal to zero. Second, escaping competition in that framework
would mean differentiating oneself more from other ﬁrms. However, the Dixit–
Stiglitz speciﬁcation used in that model requires all products to be equally
differentiated from each other, to an extent measured (inversely) by the param-
eter α, the same parameter that deﬁnes the intensity of competition between
any two intermediate ﬁrms. In this framework with no quality improvement
allowed, there is no means by which a ﬁrm can try to escape the effects of
competition.
3.2. Entry in the Schumpeterian Paradigm
Even more than competition among incumbents, Schumpeterian theory implies
that entry, exit, and turnover all have a positive effect on innovation and pro-
ductivity growth, not only in the economy as a whole but also within incumbent
ﬁrms. The idea here is that increased entry, and increased threat of entry, enhance
innovation and productivity growth, not just because these are the direct result
of quality-improving innovations from new entrants, but also because the threat
of being driven out by a potential entrant gives incumbent ﬁrms an incentive
to innovate in order to escape entry, through an effect that works much like“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 283 — #15
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the escape-competition effect described previously. This “escape-entry” effect is
especially strong for ﬁrms close to the work technology frontier. For ﬁrms fur-
ther behind the frontier, the dominant effect of entry threat is a “discouragement”
effect that works much like the Schumpeterian appropriability effect described
above.
These effects can be understood in terms of the following simple model.14
Each sector i is monopolized by an incumbent with technology parameter Ait.
EachinnovationraisesAit byaconstantfactorγ>1.Theincumbentmonopolist
in sector i earns proﬁts equal to
πit = δAit.
In every sector the probability of a potential entrant appearing is p, which
is also our measure of entry threat. We focus on technologically advanced entry;
accordingly, each potential entrant arrives with the leading-edge technology
parameter ¯ At, which grows by the factor γ with certainty each period. If the
incumbent is also on the leading edge, with Ait = ¯ At, then we assume he can
use a ﬁrst-mover advantage to block entry and retain his monopoly. But if he is
behind the leading edge, with Ait < ¯ At, then entry will occur, Bertrand competi-
tion will ensue, and the technologically dominated incumbent will be eliminated
and replaced by the entrant.
The effect of entry threat on incumbent innovation will depend on the
marginal beneﬁt vit which the incumbent expects to receive from an innovation.
Consider ﬁrst an incumbent who was on the frontier last period. If he innovates
then he will remain on the frontier, and hence will be immune to entry. His proﬁt
will then be δ ¯ At. If he fails to innovate then with probability p he will be elimi-
nated by entry and earn zero proﬁt, while with probability 1 − p he will survive
as the incumbent earning a proﬁt of δ ¯ At−1. The expected marginal beneﬁt of
an innovation to this ﬁrm is the difference between the proﬁt he will earn with
certainty if he innovates and the expected proﬁt he will earn if not
vit =[ γ − (1 − p)]δ ¯ At−1.
Because vit depends positively on the entry threat p, an increase in entry threat
willinducethisincumbenttospendmoreoninnovatingandhencetoinnovatewith
a larger probability. Intuitively, a ﬁrm close to the frontier responds to increased
entry threat by innovating more in order to escape the threat.
Nextconsideranincumbentwhowasbehindthefrontierlastperiod,andwho
will therefore remain behind the frontier even if he manages to innovate, because
the frontier will also advance by the factor γ.For this ﬁrm, proﬁts will be zero
14. ThemodeldrawsonthemoreformalanalysisofAghionetal.(2004)andAghionetal.(2005a).“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 284 — #16
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if entry occurs, whether he innovates or not, because he cannot catch up with the
frontier. Thus his expected marginal beneﬁt of an innovation will be
vit = (1 − p)(γ − 1)δAi,t−1.
That is, the expected beneﬁt is a proﬁt gain that will be realized with probability
(1−p),theprobabilitythatnopotentialentrantshowsup.Becauseinthiscasevit
dependsnegativelyontheentrythreatp,thereforeanincreaseinentrythreatwill
induce the ﬁrm to spend less on innovating and hence to innovate with a lower
probability. Intuitively, the ﬁrm that starts far behind the frontier is discouraged
from innovating as much by an increased entry threat because he is unable to
prevent the entrant from destroying the value of his innovation.
The theory thus generates the following predictions
1. Entry and entry threat enhance innovation and productivity growth among
incumbents in sectors or countries that are initially close to the technological
frontier, as the escape entry effect dominates in that case.
2. Entry and entry threat reduce innovation and productivity growth among
incumbents in sectors or countries that are far below the frontier, as the
discouragement effect dominates in that case.
3. Entry and entry threat enhance average productivity growth among incum-
bent ﬁrms when the threat has exceeded some threshold, but reduce average
productivity growth among incumbents below that threshold, because as the
probability p measuring the threat approaches unity then almost all incum-
bents will be on the frontier, having either innovated last period or entered
last period, and ﬁrms near the frontier respond to a further increase in p by
innovating more frequently.
4. Entry (and therefore, turnover) is growth-enhancing overall in the short run,15
because even in those sectors where incumbent innovation is discouraged
by the threat of entry the entrants themselves will raise productivity by
implementing a frontier technology.
3.3. Evidence
Evidence on the Growth Effects of Entry and Entry Threat. The results of this
simple extension of Schumpeterian growth theory have been corroborated by
a variety of empirical ﬁndings. First, Aghion, Blundell, Grifﬁth, Howitt, and
Prantt (henceforth ABGHP) (2004) investigate the effects of technologically
advanced entry threat on average TFP growth of incumbent UK manufactur-
ing establishments, using panel data with over 32,000 annual observations on
15. Inthelongrun,theeconomywillgrowatthesamerateγ −1astheexogenousworldtechnology
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about3,800establishmentsin166different4-digitindustriesoverthe1980–1993
period. They estimate the equation
Yijt = α + βEjt + ηi + τt + εijt, (9)
where Yijt is TFP growth in establishment i, industry j, year t, η, and τ are ﬁxed
establishmentandyeareffects,andEjt istheindustryentryrate,measuredbythe
change in the share of UK industry employment in foreign-owned plants. For the
UK foreign entrants are typically US entrants, close to the technology frontier, as
in the theory, whereas domestic entrants are typically smaller, less efﬁcient, and
less likely to survive.
Column 1 of Table 1 shows that OLS estimation produces a signiﬁcant posi-
tiveestimateofβ,indicatingthatentry-threat,asproxiedbyEjt,tendstoincrease
the average productivity growth of incumbents. Column 2 shows that this esti-
mateislargelyunaffectedbycontrollingforestablishment-speciﬁcheterogeneity.
Columns 3 and 4 are IV estimates of the equations in the ﬁrst two columns
respectively,wheretheinstrumentsforentryexploitcross-industryandtimeseries
variationinUKproductmarketregulationtriggeredbytheintroductionoftheEU
Single Market Program and US R&D intensity in the industry. The IV estimates
support the ﬁnding of a positive entry effect on average incumbent productivity
growth.
Thisentryeffectiseconomicallyaswellasstatisticallysigniﬁcant.Forexam-
ple,accordingtocolumn3,aone-standard-deviationincreaseintheentryvariable
would raise the average incumbent’s TFP growth rate by about 10 percent of the
TFP growth standard deviation in the sample.
Table 1. Change of foreign ﬁrm share and TFP growth of domestic incumbents.
Dependent variable: growth of total factor productivityijt
Independent variables OLS OLS IV IV
Change of foreign ﬁrm sharejt 0.0857∗∗ 0.0826∗ 0.3814∗∗∗ 0.3623∗∗
(0.0397)( 0.0425)( 0.1444)( 0.1366)
Market shareit−1 −1.0064∗∗∗ −0.8962∗∗∗
0.2117 0.3217
Year indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
4-digit industry indicators Yes Yes
establishment ﬁxed effects Yes Yes
Number of observations 32,339 32,339 32,339 32,339
Notes:OLSandIVregressionresultswithrobuststandarderrorsinbracketsaredisplayed.Standarderrorsareclustered
on the 4-digit industry level. Observations are weighted by the inverse of their sampling weight times their employment.
The sample consists of 32,339 observations on domestic incumbent establishments between 1981 and 1993.
*Signiﬁcant at 10%. **Signiﬁcant at 5%. ***Signiﬁcant at 1%.
Source: Aghion, Blundell, Grifﬁth, Howitt, and Prantl (2004), tables. Authors’ calculations using ONS data and other
data sources. All statistical results remain Crown Copyright.“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 286 — #18
286 Journal of the European Economic Association
In order to support the view that this effect of entry on average incumbent
productivity growth is a result of increased incumbent innovation rather than
technology spillover from, or copying of, the superior technologies brought in by
the entrants, ABGHP (2005) estimate non-linear patent count models equivalent
to the linear productivity growth model (9). Speciﬁcally, using a panel involving
over 1,000 annual observations of 176 UK ﬁrms in 60 different 3-digit industries
over the 1987–1993 period, they use the number of patents successfully applied
for by ﬁrm i in the United States as dependent variable and the lagged change
in the employment weighted share of new foreign-owned ﬁrms in the industry as
direct measure of technologically advanced entry. A count data model with con-
trolsforyeareffectsandunobservableﬁrm-speciﬁc,time-invariantheterogeneity
produces a highly signiﬁcantly positive estimate of β. The sign and signiﬁcance
of the estimate is robust to the inclusion of controls for import penetration, com-
petition, and distance to the frontier Djt, where the latter is measured by the
labor-productivity in the corresponding US industry relative to the UK indus-
try. Instrumenting for entry using a control function approach again conﬁrms the
ﬁndings.
ABGHP (2005) provide detailed evidence that the escape entry effect is
stronger for industries that are closer to the frontier. Speciﬁcally, when the inter-
actiontermEjt·Djt isaddedtotheequation,itscoefﬁcientishighlysigniﬁcantly
negative in all estimations. A one-standard-deviation increase in the entry vari-
able would reduce the estimated number of patents in an industry far from the
frontier (at the 90th percentile of Djt) by about 3.5 percent of the patent count
standard deviation in the sample and would increase the estimated number by
about 12 percent in an industry near the frontier (at the 10th percentile). Figure 1
in ABGHP (2005) shows a similar picture when total factor productivity growth
replaces patent count as the left-hand side variable. TFP growth in incumbent
establishments that are closer to the technological frontier, reacts positively to an
increase in (lagged) foreign entry whereas the opposite holds for establishments
that are far from frontier. Thus it seems that the positive effect of entry threat
on incumbent productivity growth in Europe is indeed much larger now than it
was immediately after WWII, and that the relative neglect of entry implications
of competition policy is having an increasingly detrimental effect on European
productivity growth.
Evidence on the Effects of (De)regulating Entry. Evidence that the effect of
regulatory policy depends on a country’s circumstances is provided by Aghion,
Burgess,ReddingandZilibotti(henceforthABRZ)(2005b),whostudytheeffects
of delicensing entry in India over the period from 1980–1997, during which there
were two major waves of delicensing whose timing varied across states in indus-
tries. Using an annual panel with roughly 24,000 observations on 85 industries,“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 287 — #19
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16 states, and 18 years, they show that although delicensing had no discernible
effect on overall entry it did increase the dispersion of output levels across estab-
lishments in the delicensed state-industries. Thus it seems that the effects of
regulatory liberalization depend upon speciﬁc industry characteristics. ABRZ
focused on one speciﬁc characteristic, namely the restrictiveness of labor market
regulation. They estimated an equation of the form
ln(yist) = α + β · delicenseist + γ · Lregst
+ δ · delicensesit · Lregst + ηis + τt + εijt (10)
where yist is real output, delicense is a dummy that switches when the state-
industry is delicensed, and Lregst is a measure of the degree of pro-worker
regulation. Although the coefﬁcient β was statistically insigniﬁcant, the inter-
action coefﬁcient δ was highly signiﬁcantly negative, indicating that one of the
characteristics of an industry that makes it grow faster as a result of deregulation
is the absence of restrictive labor-market regulation. This suggests a complemen-
tarity between different kinds of regulatory policy that needs to be taken into
account when designing pro-growth policies. Relaxation of entry barriers may
not succeed in promoting growth if not accompanied by other changes that are
favorable to business development.
That the overall effect β of delicensing should be negligible is consistent
withthetheoreticalmodelofABGHP(2005)wesketchedpreviously,whichsays
that the marginal effect of entry threat on average incumbent productivity growth
will be positive only if the threat already exceeds some threshold level ¯ p. Indeed,
combined with the ﬁnding of ABGHP (2004, 2005) to the effect that the effect
on overall incumbent productivity growth in the UK is positive, the result is a
conﬁrmation of this theoretical framework, became presumably entry is more
open in the UK than in India, and hence the theory predicts a more signiﬁcant
positive effect in the UK than in India.
Generally speaking, the message of ABRZ is again that the reaction to the
threatofentryposedbyliberalizationisdifferentfor“advanced”and“backward”
state-industries in the same sector. Removing barriers to entry incentivises com-
petitive advanced state-industries to invest in new production and management
practices but may have the opposite effect on “backward” state-industries that
have little chance of competing in the new environment.
SomeDirectEvidenceontheGrowth-EnhancingEffectsofExit. Althoughthese
results are consistent with the Schumpeterian emphasis on quality-improving
innovations, they are hard to reconcile with the product-variety model of Romer
(1990). First, as already pointed out above, it is not clear how one would even
interpret the empirical results concerning distance to the frontier in a horizontal“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 288 — #20
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innovationmodel(becauseinthatframeworktherearenoproductivitydifferences
betweenindustries).Second,itishardtoseehowthethreatofentryorcompetition
could promote innovation among incumbents. This section describes a variety
of additional empirical ﬁndings indicating that quality improvement and creative
destructionareindeedanecessarypartofthemechanismbywhichentrypromotes
growth.
First, in ongoing work with Pol Antras and Susanne Prantl, we use UK
establishment-level panel data and information on industry-level input-output
linkages to estimate the effect on TFP growth arising from growth in high-quality
inputinupstreamindustries,andalsofromexitofobsoleteinput-productionﬁrms
in upstream industries. Speciﬁcally, we take a panel of more than 23,000 annual
observations on about 5,000 establishments in 180 4-digit industries between
1987 and 1993, together with the 1984 UK input–output table, to estimate an
equation of the form
gijt = α + β · qjt−1 + γ · xjt−1 + δ · Zijt−1 + ηi + τt + εijt, (11)
where gijt is the TFP growth rate of establishment i in industry j. The ﬁrst
regressor is our measure of upstream quality improvement, calculated as
qjt−1 =
 
k =j
akj ·  fkt−1,
where akj is the ratio of sector j’s total inputs supplied by UK sector k plus
importedsectork-goodsbasedontheinput-outputtable,andfkt−1 istheforeign-
ﬁrm market share of sector k in t −1. The second regressor is our measure of exit
of obsolete upstream production, calculated as
xjt−1 =
 
k =j
akj ·


Nkt−2  
i=1
Lit−2 · Pit−1


  Nkt−2  
i=1
Lit−2,
where Pit−1 equals one if plant i exits between year t − 2 and year t − 1i n
industry k, and Lit−2 is employment in that plant in year t − 2. Establishment
and time ﬁxed effects are included, along with other controls in Zijt−1, including
a measure of the establishment’s lagged market share.
The result of this estimation is a signiﬁcant positive effect of both upstream
quality improvement and obsolete input production. These results are robust to
taking potential endogeneity into account by applying an instrumental variable
approach and to controlling for g and x on the downstream industry level itself.“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 289 — #21
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The effects are particularly strong for establishments that use more intermediate
inputs; that is, establishments with a share of intermediate product use above
the sample median. Altogether, the results we ﬁnd are consistent with the view
that quality-improving innovation is an important source of growth. The results
are however not consistent with the horizontal innovation model, in which there
shouldbenothingspecialabouttheentryofforeignﬁrms,andaccordingtowhich
theexitofupstreamﬁrmsshouldifanythingreducegrowthbyreducingthevariety
of inputs being used in the industry.
Comin and Mulani (2005) have produced additional evidence to the effect
that exit as well as entry is important to the growth process. Using a sample
of US ﬁrms they show that, according to two measures of turnover in indus-
try leadership that they construct, turnover is positively related to earlier R&D.
Again,thisisevidenceofacreative-destructionelementtotheinnovationprocess
that one would not expect to ﬁnd if the primary channel through which innova-
tion affected economic growth was by increasing product variety. Indeed the
product-variety theory has little to say at all about how productivity varies across
ﬁrms in an industry, let alone how the productivity ranking would change over
time.
In addition to these results, Fogel, Morck, and Yeung (2005) have produced
evidence to the effect that country-level GDP growth is linked to the turnover of
dominant ﬁrms. Using data on large corporate ﬁrms in 44 different countries over
the 1975–1996 period, they ﬁnd that economies whose top 1975 corporations
declined more grow faster than other countries with the same initial per-capita
GDP, level of education, and capital stock. Again, this evidence of an association
between growth and creative destruction has no counterpart in the horizontal-
innovation theory.
3.4. Taking Stock
Whathavewelearnedfromourdiscussioninthissection?First,wehaveseenthat
empirical evidence strongly supports the main prediction of the Schumpeterian
model,namelythat(i)entryanddelicensinghaveamorepositiveeffectongrowth
in sectors or countries that are closer to the technological frontier, but have a less
positiveeffectonsectorsorcountriesthatliefarbelowthefrontier;and(ii)exitcan
have a positive effect on productivity growth in downstream industries because it
replaces less efﬁcient input producers by more efﬁcient ones. However, the same
ﬁndings seriously question what the other models of endogenous growth have to
sayonhowgrowthisaffectedbycompetitionandentrypolicy.AKtheoryissimply
silentonthistopic,asuptonowithasbeendevelopedexclusivelyusingthetheory
of perfect competition. And the product variety model delivers counterfactual
predictions, namely, (a) that increased product market competition, which in that“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 290 — #22
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model corresponds to a higher degree of substitutability between intermediate
inputs,hasanunambiguouslynegativeeffectonproductivitygrowthasitreduces
the monopoly rents accruing to a successful innovator and therefore her incentive
to invest in R&D; this prediction is at odds with a variety of evidence, especially
the results of Nickell (1996) and Blundell, Grifﬁth, and Van Reenen (1995) to
the effect that UK manufacturing ﬁrms tended to have faster TFP growth rates,
and higher innovation rates, in industries facing more intense product-market
competition;(b)thatentryisgrowth-enhancingnomatterthecountry’sorsector’s
level of technological development, unlike what we have shown above based on
UKorIndiancross-industrydata;(c)thatexitreducesgrowthbyreducingproduct
variety; however we saw that current work by Fogel, Morck, and Yeung (2005),
by Comin and Mulani (2005), and by our joint work with Pol Antras and Susanne
Prantl, all point to positive effects of exit and/or turnover on growth.
Second, the analysis and empirical ﬁndings reported here have important
policy implications. In particular, they go directly against the belief that national
or European “champions” are best placed to innovate at the frontier, or that these
should be put in charge of selecting new research projects for public funding, as
recently proposed by Jean-Louis Beffa of Saint-Gobain in a report to President
Chirac. Instead, as we recommended in Sapir et al. (2003), any product market
regulation, including the Single Market legislation, should be reexamined for its
effects on new entry. In the past competition policy in Europe has been used to
a large extent as a mechanism to increase openness and integration (in particular
through the design and enforcement of the dominance criterion), not so much
competition per se, and if it has affected competition it is mainly by policing
anti-competitive behavior among incumbent ﬁrms, while paying little attention
toentry.TheSchumpeterianmodelinthissection,andtheevidencesupportingit,
suggestthatalthoughdisregardingentrywasnobigdealduringthe30yearsimme-
diately after World War II when Europe was still far behind the US and catching
up with it, nevertheless now that Europe has come close to the world technol-
ogy frontier this relative neglect of entry considerations is having an increasingly
depressing effect on European growth.
4. Education
Is the European education system growth-maximizing? A ﬁrst look at the US
versustheEUin1999–2000showsthat37.3%oftheU.S.populationaged25–64
have completed a higher education degree, against only 23.8% of the EU pop-
ulation. This educational attainment comparison is mirrored by that on tertiary
education expenditure, with the US devoting 3% of its GDP to tertiary educa-
tion versus only 1.4% in the EU. Is this European deﬁcit in tertiary education
investment a big deal for growth?“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 291 — #23
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4.1. Mankiw-Romer-Weil and Lucas
Onceagain,ourﬁrstreﬂexistogetbacktotheliteratureoneducationandgrowth.
First,tomodelsbasedoncapitalaccumulation.There,theneo-classicalreference
is Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) (henceforth MRW), and the AK reference
is the celebrated article by Lucas (1988). Both papers emphasize human capital
accumulation as a source of growth. In MRW, which is an augmented version
of the Solow model with human capital as an additional accumulating factor
of production, human capital accumulation slows down the convergence to the
steady-state by counteracting the effects of decreasing returns to physical capital
accumulation. In Lucas, instead, the assumption that human capital accumulates
ataspeedproportionaltotheexistingstockofhumancapitalleadsapositivelong-
rungrowthrate.Whetheronthetransitionpathtothesteady-state(inMRW)orin
steady-state (in Lucas), the rate of growth depends upon the rate of accumulation
of human capital, not upon the stock of human capital. Moreover, these capital
accumulation–based models do not distinguish between primary/secondary and
tertiary education: The two are perfect substitutes in these models. Thus, if we
believe these models, it is not a problem if the US spends more than Europe in
highereducation,aslongastotalspendingandattainmentineducationasawhole
havenotincreasedfasterintheUSthaninEurope.Andindeedtheyhavenotdone
so over the past decade.
Does this mean that education policy is not an issue, or rather that we should
not fully believe in these models? What tilts us more towards the latter is ﬁrst
the work by Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) who argued, based on cross-country
regressions over the 1965–1985 period, that human capital accumulation (where
human capital is measured by school enrollment) was not signiﬁcantly correlated
with growth, whereas human capital stocks were. Another source of scepticism
is the ﬁnding by Ha and Howitt (2005) that the trend growth rate of the number
of R&D workers in the US has gone down over past 50 years, whereas the trend
rate of productivity growth has not.
4.2. Nelson-Phelps and the Schumpeterian Approach
More than just questioning the capital accumulation approach to education and
growth, Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) provided support to the Schumpeterian
approach by resurrecting the simple model by Nelson and Phelps (1966). Nelson
and Phelps did not have a model of endogenous growth with endogenous R&D
and innovation, but they were already thinking of growth as being generated by
productivity-improving adaptations, whose arrival rate would depend upon the
stock of human capital. More formally, Nelson and Phelps would picture a world
economy in which, in any given country, productivity grows according to an“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 292 — #24
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equation of the form
˙ A = f(h)( ¯ A − A),
where again ¯ A denotes the frontier technology (itself growing over time at some
exogenous rate), and h is the current stock of human capital in the country. A
higher stock of human capital would thus foster growth by making it easier for a
country to catch up with the frontier technology. Benhabib and Spiegel tested a
slightly augmented version of the Nelson-Phelps model in which human capital
does not only facilitate the adaptation to more advanced technologies, by also
makes it easier to innovate at the frontier, according to a dynamic equation of the
form
˙ A = f(h)( ¯ A − A) + g(h)γA,
where the second term capture the innovation component of growth.
Using cross country-regressions of the increase in the log of per capita GDP
overtheperiod1965–1985asalinearfunctionofthesumoflogsofhumancapital
stocks over all the years between 1965 and 1985, Benhabib and Spiegel found
a signiﬁcantly positive correlation between the two, which in turn was evidence
that the rate of productivity growth is also positively correlated with the stock
of human capital. Moreover, Benhabib and Spiegel found a larger correlation for
countries further below the world technology frontier, which would hint at the
catch-up component of growth being the dominant one. Thus, more than the rate
of human capital accumulation, it is its stock that matters for growth. Does this
help us understand the comparison between Europe and the US?
Unfortunately, more recent work by Krueger and Lindahl (2001) would tem-
per our optimism. Using panel data over 110 countries between 1960 and 1990,
choosingthenumberofyearsineducationinsteadofthelogarithmofthatnumber
to measure human capital,16 and correcting for measurement errors, Krueger and
Lindahl would still ﬁnd a positive correlation between growth and human capital
stocks (although they also found a positive correlation between growth and the
16. This change was in turn motivated by the so-called Mincerian approach to human capital,
whereby the value of one more year in schooling is measured by the wage increase that is foregone
bytheindividualwhochoosestostudyduringthatyearinsteadofworking.Thisamountstomeasuring
the value of a human capital stock by the log of the current wage rate earned by an individual. And
that log was shown by Mincer to be positively correlated to the number of years spend at school by
the individual, after estimating an equation of the form
lnw = a0 + a1n.
The Mincerian approach can itself be criticized, however, for: (i) assuming perfectly competitive
labor markets; (ii) ignoring the role of schools as selection devices; and (iii) ignoring interpersonal
and intertemporal knowledge externalities.“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 293 — #25
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rate of accumulation of human capital), however the signiﬁcance of the correla-
tion between growth and human capital stocks would disappear when restricting
the regression to OECD countries.
4.3. Schumpeter meets Gerschenkron
Should we conclude from Krueger and Lindahl (2001) that education only mat-
ters for catching-up but not for innovating at the frontier and that, consequently,
education is not an area which Europe needs to reform in order to resume grow-
ing at a rate at least equal to that of the US? The new hint at that point came
from AAZ’s (2002) idea on appropriate institutions and economic growth, which
we already spelled out in Section 217 As in Benhabib and Spiegel (1991), pro-
ductivity growth in AAZ can be generated either by implementing (or imitating)
the frontier technology or by innovating on past technologies, and obviously
the relative importance of innovation increases as a country or region moves
closer to the technology frontier. However, and this is where we use AAZ and
thereby depart from Benhabib and Spiegel, different types of education spend-
ing lie behind imitation and innovation activities. In particular, higher education
investment should have a bigger effect on a country’s ability to make leading-
edge innovations, whereas primary and secondary education are more likely to
makeadifferenceintermsofthecountry’sabilitytoimplementexisting(frontier)
technologies.
Distance to Frontier and the Composition of Education Spending. Now, what
are the potential implications of this approach for education policy, and is there
something to learn from the comparison between Europe and the US given
the disappointing news of Krueger and Lindahl from cross-OECD country
regressions? The remaining part of the section is based on work by Vanden-
bussche, Aghion, and Meghir (2004) (henceforth VAM), and current work by
Aghion, Boustan, Hoxby, and Vandenbussche (2005) (henceforth ABHV). The
starting point of these two papers is that, in contrast to the Nelson–Phelps or
Benhabib–Spiegel models, human capital does not affect innovation and imita-
tion uniformly: More speciﬁcally, primary/secondary education tends to produce
imitators, whereas tertiary (especially graduate) education is more likely to pro-
duceinnovators.Thisrealisticassumption,inturn,leadstothepredictionthat,asa
country moves closer to technological frontier, tertiary education should become
increasingly important for growth compared to primary/secondary education (all
measured in stocks).
17. That hint in turn provided the backbone for the Sapir Report and its application to education
lead to a report on “Education and Growth” for the French Conseil d’Analyse Economique.“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 294 — #26
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First,notethatthissimplecombinationofAAZwiththeNelson-Phelpsmodel
of education and growth, provides a solution to the Krueger-Lindahl puzzle.
Namely, that total human capital stock
U + S
is not a sufﬁcient statistics to predict growth in OECD countries. For example,
take two countries A and B at same distance of world frontier, with same total
human capital, but
SA >S B.
Country A will grow faster if the two countries are sufﬁciently close to frontier
whereas country B will grow faster if both countries are far from frontier, and yet
the two countries have the same total amount of human capital.
Now, going in slightly greater details into formalization, VAM and ABHV
focus on the following class of productivity growth functions:
Ait − Ait−1 = uσ
m,i,ts1−σ
m,i,t ¯ At−1 + γu
φ
n,i,ts
1−φ
n,i,tAt−1 = g(u,s), (12)
where ¯ At−1 is the frontier productivity last period, At−1 is the average produc-
tivity in the country last period, um (resp. un) is the number of workers with
primary/secondary education (unskilled workers) used in imitation (resp. inno-
vation), sm (resp. sn) is the number of workers with higher education (skilled
workers) in imitation, and
u = (um,u n);s = (sm,s n),
and
σ>φ
sothattheelasticityofproductivitygrowthwithrespecttoskilled(resp.unskilled)
workers is larger in innovation (resp. in imitation).
Letting at = At/ ¯ At denote the country’s proximity to the technological
frontier at date t, and letting the frontier grow at constant rate ¯ g,the intermediate
producer will choose u and s to maximize proﬁts. Dividing through by ¯ At−1 and
dropping time subscripts, the producer’s problem simply becomes
max
um,unsm,sn
 
δ
 
uσ
ms1−σ
m + γu φ
ns1−φ
n a
 
− wu(um + un) − ws(sm + sn)
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where we eliminate the ﬁrm’s subscript i because all intermediate ﬁrms face the
same maximization problem. Moreover, in equilibrium we necessarily have
um + un = U;sm + sn = S,
whereU andS arethetotalsuppliesofworkerswithprimary/secondaryeducation
and tertiary education respectively.
What we have here is formally equivalent to a small open economy model
with two factors and two products, where the two products are imitation and
innovation, whose prices, δ and δγa, are exogenously given. As in standard trade
theory,thesegivenoutputpricesuniquelydeterminetheequilibriumfactorprices
wu and ws. The “revenue” in ﬁrms’ objective function is proportional to the
growth rate (plus unity). Solving for the equilibrium allocations of skilled and
unskilled labor between imitation and innovation as a function of U, S and the
proximity a to the technological frontier, one can look at how the equilibrium
growth rate
g∗(U,S,a)= g(u∗(U,S,a),s∗(U,S,a))
varies with either of those three variables.
In particular, looking at the cross derivative of g∗ with respect to S and a,we
ﬁnd
∂2g∗
∂a∂S
> 0;
inotherwords,amarginalincreaseinthefractionofworkerswithhighereducation
enhances productivity growth all the more the closer the country is to the world
technology frontier.
The intuition for this result relies on the Rybczynski theorem in interna-
tional trade, which in turn implies that a marginal increase in the supply S of
highlyeducatedworkersleadstoanevengreaternumberofskilledworkersbeing
employed in innovation. Because the change does not affect equilibrium factor
prices,thereforeitleavesthefactorproportionsunchangedineachactivity,mean-
ing that innovation also attracts an increased number of unskilled workers. More
precisely,becauseσ>φ ,sothatinnovationistheskill-intensiveactivity,innova-
tion will increase but imitation will decrease. The effect on ﬁrms’ “revenue,” and
hence the effect on the economy’s growth rate, is positive. For countries closer
to the frontier, where “price” of innovation δγa is larger, the effect is larger than
for countries further from the frontier.“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 296 — #28
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Cross-Country Evidence. VAM confront this prediction with cross-country
panelevidenceonhighereducation,distancetofrontier,andproductivitygrowth.
ABHV tests the theory on cross-US state data. Each approach has its pros and
cons. Cross-US-state analysis uses a much richer data set and also very good
instruments for higher and lower education spending. However, a serious analy-
sis of the growth impact of education spending across US states must take into
account an additional element not considered in previous models, namely the
effects on the migration of skilled labor across states at different levels of techno-
logical development. On the other hand, cross-country analysis can safely ignore
the migration, however the data are sparse and the instruments for educational
spending are weak (they mainly consists of lagged spending). In the remaining
part of the section we shall consider the two pieces of empirical analysis in turn.
VAM consider a panel data set of 22 OECD countries over the period 1960–
2000,whichtheysubdivideintoﬁve-yearsubperiods.Outputandinvestmentdata
are drawn from Penn World Tables 6.1 and human capital data from Barro and
Lee(2000).TheBarroandLeedataindicatethefractionofacountry’spopulation
that has reached a certain level of schooling at intervals of ﬁve years, so they use
the fraction that has received some higher education together with their measure
of total factor productivity (TFP) (constructed assuming a constant labor share of
0.65 across country) to perform the regression
gj,t = α0 + α1distj,t−1 + α2 j,t + α3(distj,t−1 ∗  j,t) + υj + uj,t,
where gj,t is country j’s growth rate over a ﬁve-year period, distj,t−1 is country
j’s closeness to the technological frontier at t −1 (i.e., 5 years before),  j,t is the
fraction of the working age population with some higher education, and υj is a
country’sﬁxedeffect.Theclosenessandhumancapitalvariablesareinstrumented
with their values at t − 2 and the equation is estimated in differences to elimi-
nate the ﬁxed effect. Before controlling for country ﬁxed effects, VAM obtain a
statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient of −1.87 for the human capital variable, and a
statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient of 2.37 for the interaction variable, indicating
that indeed higher education matters more as a country gets closer to the frontier.
Controlling for country ﬁxed effects removes the signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients,
however this signiﬁcance is restored once country are regrouped into subregions
and country ﬁxed effects are replaced by group ﬁxed effects. This, in turn, sug-
gests that cross-country data on only 22 countries are too sparse for signiﬁcant
regression results to survive when we control for country ﬁxed effects.
To see how this result translates in terms of the effect of an additional
year of schooling of higher education, they perform the following regression in
logs:
gj,t = α
 
0 + α
 
1dist
 
j,t−1 + α
 
2Nj,t + α
 
3(distj,t−1 ∗ Nj,t) + υ
 
j + u
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where this time dist
 
j,t−1 is the log of the closeness to the technological frontier
and Nj,t is the average number of years of higher education of the population.
The econometric technique employed is the same as before. Before controlling
for country ﬁxed effects, VAM ﬁnd the coefﬁcient of the number of years to be
0.105 and of little signiﬁcance, but the coefﬁcient of the interaction variable to
be equal to 0.368 and signiﬁcant. This result again demonstrates that it is more
important to expand years of higher education close to the technological frontier.
Cross-US-States Evidence. ABHV test the same theory on cross-US-state data
instead of cross-country data. As we mentioned, one potential problem when
moving from cross-country to cross-region data, is that educational policy should
affect migration ﬂows across regions more than it affects migration ﬂows across
countries. Thus a suitable model of education and growth across regions within a
same country ought to include an additional equation describing how migration
ﬂows varies for example with the wage differential between a particular state
and the state currently at the technological frontier. Introducing the possibility
of migration reinforces the positive interaction between closeness to the frontier
and higher education. Namely, in addition to the Rybczynski effect described
previously,investinginhighereducationinastatethatisfarfromthetechnological
frontier would contribute all the less to growth in that state that the newly skilled
workers would migrate to a more frontier state where productivity and therefore
wages are higher.
Any regression with growth on the left-hand-side and education on the right-
hand-side raises an obvious endogeneity problem, best emphasized by Bils and
Klenow (2000). Here, as in the above cross-country panel regressions, the endo-
geneity problem can be stated as follows: If states or countries choose their
composition of education spending according to the model, then we should see
the composition of educational investments being highly correlated with tech-
nology and productivity, and therefore the regressions would say nothing about
causality.
However, the great advantage of moving from cross-country to cross-state
analysis is that we have access to a natural source of exogenous mistakes in edu-
cation investment, namely political economy considerations which may lead the
congress or other federal instances to misallocate the funding to higher education
acrossstates.Forexample,becauseithasarepresentativeonacongressionalcom-
missionforhighereducation,afar-from-the-frontierstatemayendupmistakenly
receiving excessive funding for research-related education. Conversely, because
of local political economy considerations, a close-to-the-frontier state may end
up mistakenly focusing its investment in primary education, neglecting higher
education.
In other words, political economy considerations and the politicians’s ability
and incentive to deliver “porks” to their constituencies, provide a natural source“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 298 — #30
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of instruments that predict states’ tendencies to make exogenous mistakes when
investing in education.
The actual instruments used in ABHV are the following:
1. For research-university education: Whether a state has a congressman on the
appropriations committee which allocate funds for research universities but
not other types of schools.
2. For “low-brow” post-secondary education (community colleges, training
schools): Whether the chairman of the state’s education committee represents
voters whose children attend one- or two-year postsecondary institutions.
3. For primary and secondary education: Whether the overall political balance
on the state’s supreme court interacts with the state school ﬁnance system.
Then, using annual panel data over the period 1970–2000, ABHV perform a
two-stage procedure whereby: (i) In ﬁrst-stage regressions, the various kinds of
educational spending are regressed over their respective instruments; and (ii) the
growth rate in each state and year, is regressed over the instruments for the var-
ious kinds of educational spending, the state’s proximity to the frontier, and the
interaction between the two, controlling for state and year ﬁxed effects.
We refer our readers to ABHV (2005) for the detailed regression results,
which yield the following conclusions. First, in contrast to our previous cross-
country analysis, here the correlations remain signiﬁcant even after controlling
for state ﬁxed effects without having to regroup the country dummies. Second,
the above instruments are very strong, with an F-statistic of more than 10 for the
joint signiﬁcance of the two dummies for senator and house representative on the
corresponding appropriation committees as determinants of research education
spending. For example, every additional representative on the House Appropria-
tion committee increases the expenditure on research-type education by $597 per
cohort member, which is considerable. Now, turning to the second-stage regres-
sions, ABHV ﬁnd that an additional $1,000 per person in research education
spending raises the state’s per-employee growth rate by 0.27% if the state is at
the frontier (with a close to 1), whereas it raises it by only 0.09% if the state is
far from the frontier (with a close to 0.3). More generally, the closer a state gets
to the technological frontier, the more growth-enhancing it becomes to invest in
higher education and the less growth-enhancing it becomes to emphasize lower
education.
4.4. Taking Stock
What have we learned from our discussion in this section? First, that capital
accumulation-based models have little to say about education policy, particularly
with regard to the increasing growth gap between Europe and the US. Second,“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 299 — #31
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that Schumpeterian models that emphasize the interplay between human capi-
tal stocks and the innovation process have more potential for delivering policy
recommendations, yet when looking at educational spending as a whole there
is not much that be said from looking at cross-OECD comparisons. However,
once we distinguish between imitation and frontier innovation and map these
two sources of productivity growth to different segments of the education sys-
tem, then we can come up with relevant policy recommendations for regions like
Europe that have moved closer to the frontier and yet are maintaining very low
levels of higher education spending compared to the US. The above regressions
suggest indeed that putting the emphasis on primary/secondary education was
ﬁne as long as Europe was technologically far from the US and therefore relying
more on imitation as a main source of growth, but that now that the growth poten-
tial of imitation is wearing out, it becomes more urgent to invest more in higher
education in order to foster innovation. In fact, the cross-country (cross-OECD)
analysis in VAM shows the additional result that if we include a dummy for 1985
(equal to zero before 1985 and to one after) in the regressions, and interact that
dummy with all the right-hand-side terms in the regression, one ﬁnds that after
1985, the interaction between higher education investment and the proximity to
the technological frontier, becomes insigniﬁcant: This, in turn indicates that on
top of the above consideration, something happened during the 1980s (global-
ization and/or the IT revolution?) that would make it more growth-enhancing for
all OECD countries to shift their emphasis higher education.
5. Macropolicy
There is a common prejudice in macroeconomics, which is widely shared among
policymakers, which they learned in their undergraduate education years and
which we still see being developed in most textbooks of intermediate macroe-
conomics: Namely, that there is a perfect dichotomy between on the one hand
macroeconomic policy (budget deﬁcit, taxation, money supply) taken to affect
primarily the short-run and whose primary aim is to stabilize the economy; and
on the other hand, long-run economic growth, which is either taken to be exoge-
nous or to depend only upon structural characteristics of the economy (property
right enforcement, market structure, market mobility, and so forth). The only link
between macropolicy and long-run growth that most policy makers believe in is
that growth requires macroeconomic stability, everything else remaining equal.
5.1. The Failure of the AK Attempt
The ﬁrst attempt at overcoming this dichotomy between short-run and long-
run came with the AK wave of endogenous growth models. Thus Easterly“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 300 — #32
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(forthcomming) shows that the effect of taxation on growth can be much reduced
when output is produced using two types of capital, one that is produced by the
formal sector and can therefore be taxed, whereas the other type is produced by
the informal sector and thus immune from taxation. Obviously, an increased tax
rate on formal sector capital will induce individual producers to resort more to
the informal sector capital, hence a smaller effect on growth if the two types of
capital goods are (sufﬁciently) close substitutes. More fundamentally, Easterly
points out that poor institutions will lead to a low value of A,which by itself will
reduce the growth impact of any macroeconomic policy.
Going from theory to empirics, Easterly (forthcomming) considers six vari-
ables, some of which are more structural (like ﬁnancial depth) and others which
aremorepolicy(inﬂation,budgetbalance,realovervaluation,tradeopenness,and
black-market premium). He then regresses growth over these variables, using a
cross-countrypanelofﬁve-yearaveragesoverthe1960–2000period.HisTable4
shows signiﬁcant effects of these variables on growth, with the expected signs
(for example, higher inﬂation, which implies a higher inﬂation tax, is detrimental
to growth, budget balance is growth-enhancing as it predicts a lower tax rate in
the future etc.). Unfortunately, as shown in his Table 6, all these effects become
insigniﬁcantifweremovecountriesforwhichpoliciesareextreme(e.g.,countries
with inﬂation rates greater than 30% or with budget deﬁcits higher than 12% of
GDP). Thus, if extreme policies are bad for growth, macropolicy and policy in
general should have no impact on growth if we restrict the analysis to reasonable
countries.Inparticular,giventhatbothEUcountriesandtheUSfallintothelatter
category,theanalysisinEasterly(forthcomming)wouldimplythatmacropolicies
have nothing to do with explaining the increasing growth gap between the EU
and the US.
One could argue that Easterly restricts his analysis to average policies
over time and ignores the existence of shocks and business cycles. He there-
fore abstracts from the potential effects that macropolicies could have on
growth, for example through stabilizing the economy and helping individual
producers smooth out the effects of cycles and shocks. However, AK mod-
els of volatility and growth have been developed by King and Rebelo (1993),
Stadler (1990) and more recently by Jones, Manuelli, and Stacchetti (2001).
The idea in these models is that macroeconomic volatility may affect long-
run growth through its effects on aggregate savings and investment (recall
that in the AK framework, growth is entirely driven by capital accumulation).
Thus higher volatility will tend to increase the supply of savings as individu-
als will wish to save more for precautionary motives; but higher volatility will
tend to reduce the demand for investment as it will reduce the risk-adjusted
rate of return on investment. Jones, Manuelli, and Stacchetti show that which
of these latter two effects dominates depends upon the representative house-
hold’s elasticity of intertemporal substitution. This is all very nice and elegant,“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 301 — #33
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but if we now take a look at cross country or panel regressions of growth
on volatility or commodity price shocks, as in Table 2, drawn from Aghion,
Angeletos, Banerjee and Manova (2005) (henceforth AABM), we see that con-
trolling for total investment over GDP reduces the (negative) correlation between
volatility and growth (or the positive correlation between good shocks and
growth) by only 20% and without reducing the signiﬁcance of these correlation
terms.
This,inturnimpliesthattotalinvestmentcannotbethemainchannelwhereby
a stabilizing macroeconomic policy may affect growth through affecting the
impact of volatility. Thus, once again, we need to move out of AK and consider
alternative models of endogenous growth.18
5.2. A Schumpeterian Approach to Volatility and Growth
A more Schumpeterian view of business cycles and growth is that recessions
provide a cleansing mechanism for correcting organizational inefﬁciencies and
for encouraging ﬁrms to reorganize, innovate, or reallocate to new markets. The
cleansing effect of recessions is also to eliminate those ﬁrms that are unable
to reorganize or innovate. Schumpeter himself would summarize that view as
follows: “[Recessions] are but temporary. They are means to reconstruct each
time the economic system on a more efﬁcient plan” (Schumpeter 1934). Now,
if ﬁrms could always borrow enough funds to either reorganize their activities
or move to new activities and markets, and the same was true for workers try-
ing to relocate from one job to another, the best would be to recommend that
governments do not intervene over the business cycle, and instead let markets
operate.
However, as emphasized by Aghion, Angeletos, Banerjee, and Manova
(2005) (AABM), things become quite different when credit market imperfec-
tions prevent ﬁrms from innovating and reorganizing in recessions. In particular,
suppose that ﬁrms can choose between short-run capital investment and long-
term R&D investment (this choice amounts to a research arbitrage condition).
18. Krebs (2003) has a 2-sector AK model that produces a negative effect of volatility on growth
evenwithaunitaryelasticityofintertemporalsubstitution.Inhismodel,themainimpactofvolatility
on the representative household is to increase the variance of uninsurable human-capital shocks (for
example, spells of unemployment), which leads the household to invest too little in human versus
physical capital, taking the economy away from the growth-maximizing von Neumann ray. This
is also an effect which depends upon ﬁnancial development, to the extent that increased ﬁnancial
developmentbringsaboutmorecompleterisk-sharingarrangementsandthereforereducestheextent
of underinvestment in human capital. To rule out Krebs’s interpretation of the correlation between
volatility and growth we would have to control for investment rates in both human and physical
capital, allowing for the composition of investments to matter.“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 302 — #34
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Innovating requires that ﬁrms survive short-run liquidity shocks (R&D is a
long-term investment) and that to cover liquidity costs ﬁrms can rely only
on their short-run earnings plus borrowing. Suppose in addition that growth
is driven by innovations, with the growth rate of knowledge (or average pro-
ductivity) being proportional to the ﬂow of innovating ﬁrms in the economy.
Absent credit constraints, and provided the value of innovation is sufﬁciently
high, volatility will not affect innovation and growth as ﬁrms can always bor-
row up to the net present value of their future earnings in order to cover
the short-run liquidity costs. But, now, suppose that the borrowing capacity
of ﬁrms is proportional to their current earnings (the factor of proportion-
ality is what we refer to as the credit multiplier, with a higher multiplier
reﬂecting a higher degree of ﬁnancial development in the economy). In a
recession, current earnings are reduced, and therefore so is the ﬁrms’ ability
to borrow in order to innovate. This, in turn implies that the lower ﬁnan-
cial development, the more the anticipation of recessions will discourage R&D
investments if those are decided before ﬁrms know the realization of the aggre-
gate shock19 (because ﬁrms anticipate that with higher probability, their R&D
investment will not pay out in the long-run as it will not survive the liquidity
shock).
Moreformally,supposethattheliquidityshock ˜ cisidiosyncraticacrossﬁrms,
but i.i.d distributed with cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) F, and that the
aggregate shock at over time is distributed according to
at =¯ a + εt,
where ρ<1 and εt is i.i.d over time and normally distributed with mean zero
and variance σ2.
Firms live for two periods; at the beginning of the ﬁrst period, say period t,
they decide about how to allocate their initial wealth between: (i) short-run
capital investment kt, which yields short run proﬁt a(kt)α at the end of the
ﬁrst period; and (ii) long-term R&D investment zt , which yields an innova-
tion value vt+1 equal to the expected productivity E(at+1) in period (t + 1)
with probability q(zt) = zα
t in the second period provided the ﬁrm overcomes
potential liquidity shocks that may occur at the end of their ﬁrst period. The
investment decision is made before the realization of the aggregate shock at.
Credit market imperfections prevent a ﬁrm with short-run proﬁt ﬂow a(kt)α to
invest more than µa(kt)α for the purpose of covering its idiosyncratic liquidity
cost ˜ c.
19. See AABM (2005) for the case where investment composition is decided after the realization
of the aggregate shock at.“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 304 — #36
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Because ﬁrms choose the allocation of investment before they learn the
realization of at, they choose k and z to
max
k,z
{Et(at)(kt)α + Et(at+1)(zt)αEt(F(µat(kt)α)}
such that kt + zt ≤ µw,
where Et refers to the expected value at date t,and where we assume that
Et(at) = Et(at+1) =¯ a.
Assuming that the c.d.f for the liquidity shock, F,is concave, it is immediate to
seethatamean-preservingspreadofat willreducetheﬁrm’sincentivetoinvestin
R&D and it will also reduce the expected probability of overcoming the liquidity
shock, Et(F(µat(kt)α). It will thus reduce even more the expected growth rate
equal to
gt = (zt)αEt(F(µat(kt)α).
Based on cross-country panel data over the period 1960–2000, AABM show
that the interaction term between ﬁnancial development and volatility is indeed
signiﬁcantly positive. In theory, one could imagine a counteracting effect of
volatility on growth, namely that higher volatility also means higher proﬁts in
booms,andthereforeapossiblyhigherabilityforﬁrmstoinnovateduringbooms;
however, the regressions in AABM, Ramey and Ramey (1995), or in Section 5.3,
all suggest that this latter effect is of second order.
5.3. The Effects of Countercyclical Macropolicies on Growth
Having shown that macroeconomic volatility tends to be more harmful to growth
thelowerthelevelofﬁnancialdevelopment,anaturalconjectureisthatthetighter
the credit constraints faced by ﬁrms, the greater the scope for appropriate govern-
ment intervention in particular to reduce the costs that negative liquidity shocks
imposeoncredit-constrainedﬁrms.Thatgovernmentinterventionmightincrease
aggregate efﬁciency in an economy subject to credit constraints and aggregate
shocks has already been pointed for example by Holmstrom and Tirole (1998).
However, this point has never been formally made in the context of a growth
model, nor have its potential empirical and policy implications been explored so
far. This section reports a ﬁrst attempt20 at ﬁlling this gap, more precisely by
20. The material in this section is drawn from current work by Aghion, Barro, and Marinescu, on
cyclical budgetary policies and productivity growth.“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 305 — #37
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analyzing the interplay between ﬁnancial development and the growth effects of
different types of cyclical macropolicies.
To the extent that, in an economy with tight credit constraints, the occur-
rence of a recession forces a number of ﬁrms to cut on innovative investments
in order to survive idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, a natural idea is that a coun-
tercyclical budgetary may foster innovation and growth by reducing the negative
consequences of a recession (or a bad aggregate shock) on ﬁrms’ innovative
investments. For example, the government may decide to increase the volume of
its public investments, thereby fostering the demand for private ﬁrms’ products.
Or the government may choose to directly increase its subsidies to private enter-
prises, thereby increasing their liquidity holdings and thus making it easier for
them to face idiosyncratic liquidity shocks without having to sacriﬁce R&D or
other types of longer-term growth-enhancing investments. From our analysis in
the previous section, a natural prediction is that the lower the level of ﬁnancial
development, that is, the tighter the credit constraints faced by ﬁrms, the more
growth-enhancing such countercyclical policies should be.
Current work by Aghion, Barro and Marinescu (henceforth ABM), analyzes
the effects of (counter)cyclical budgetary policies on growth, using annual panel
dataon17OECDcountriesovertheperiod1965–2001;inparticular,theyrestrict
their analysis to a subset of “reasonable” countries for which Easterly (forth-
comming) would predict no effect of policy! Then, ABM perform two-stage
least-square regressions where:
1. The ﬁrst stage regressions estimate, for each year, the correlations between:
(i) on the left-hand side of the ﬁrst-stage equation, variables such as: gov-
ernment debt, primary budget deﬁcit, government investment, government
consumption, defense spending, social security spending, direct subsidies to
privateenterprises;(ii)ontheright-handsideoftheﬁrst-stageequation:(a)the
current output gap (measured by the difference between the real GDP and the
maximumpotentialGDP,thatistheGDPatminimumlevelofnon-inﬂationary
employment for given capital stock; (b) the current gap in government expen-
ditures (measured by the deviation of government expenditure to its trend);
and(iii)thelaggedpublicdebttoGDPratio(whichreﬂectstheshareofpublic
spending used to meet the outstanding public debt obligations).
Figure 2 summarizes the results from the ﬁrst-stage regressions with the
primary budget deﬁcit as the left-hand-side variable for UK and France; on
average over the period, the UK show a much higher degree of councercycli-
cality of its budget deﬁcit than France does.
2. The second stage regressions estimate, the annual growth rate of per capita
GDP (left-hand side variable) as a function of: (i) the lagged value of the
cyclicalitycoefﬁcientobtainedfromtheﬁrststageregression,whichwedenote
by lcycl; (ii) lagged ﬁnancial development, lpc, which we measure once again“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 306 — #38
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Figure 2. Results from ﬁrst-stage regressions for UK and France.
bytheratioofprivatecredittoGDP;and(iii)theinteractionlcycl_lpcbetween
these two variables. Our prediction is that the coefﬁcient on lcycl should be
negative (a procyclical budgetary policy is bad for growth in a country with no
creditatall)whereastheinteractioncoefﬁcientonlcycl_lpc shouldbepositive
(a procyclical budgetary policy is less detrimental to growth, the higher the
level of ﬁnancial development).
The second-stage results with regard to the primary deﬁcit show that a more
procyclical primary deﬁcit is detrimental to growth (the coefﬁcient on lcycl is
negative equal to −0.008 if we consider the whole sample of countries, and to
−0.015 if we restrict the analysis to countries where the variance in the cycl
coefﬁcient in a VC estimation for the ﬁrst-stage, is non-zero.
Having shown that countercyclical budget deﬁcits can be growth-enhancing,
the next step is to look at the composition of public spending. ABM consider
thefollowingcategoriesofspending:(i)publicinvestment;(ii)defensespending,
which is part of (i); (iii) direct subsidies to private enterprises; (iv) government
consumption; and(v)socialsecurity. Foreachcategory,ABMperformﬁrst-stage
regressions of the corresponding variable on the output gap for each country,
which yields the corresponding cyclicality coefﬁcient. Then in the second-stage
regression, productivity growth is regressed over that coefﬁcient, ﬁnancial devel-
opment,andtheinteractionbetweenthetwo,controllingforcountry,oryearﬁxed
effects, or both.
Here we shall only show the tables for public investment and government
consumption, as the difference between the two is striking. On the one hand, as
showninTable3,countercyclicalpublicinvestmentsarehighlygrowth-enhancing
atlowlevelsofﬁnancialdevelopmentwithhighlynegativeandsigniﬁcantcorrela-
tionsbetweenproductivitygrowthandthelaggedcyclicalityofpublicinvestment
(negative coefﬁcients which are signiﬁcant at the 5% both, in the regression con-
trollingforthelineartimetrendorthatcontrollingforyearﬁxedeffects),whereas
the interaction coefﬁcients are positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% or 1% when
controlling for year ﬁxed effects.“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 307 — #39
Aghion and Howitt Appropriate Growth Policy 307
Table 3. Public investment.
Growth of GDP per capita
No year effects Linear time trend Year ﬁxed effects
Lag(procyclicality of public −0.082 −0.077 −0.072
investment) (0.054)( 0.054)( 0.035)∗∗
Lag(private credit/GDP) −0.013 −0.015 −0.012
(0.007)∗ (0.007)∗∗ (0.005)∗∗
Lag(procyclicality of public 0.071 0.080 0.082
investment ∗ private credit/GDP) (0.034)∗∗ (0.034)∗∗ (0.025)∗∗∗
Relative GDP per capita 0.001 0.032 0.038
(0.004)( 0.013)∗∗ (0.021)∗
Year 0.001
(0.001)∗∗
Constant 0.039 −2.441 0.225
(0.017)∗∗ (0.973)∗∗ (0.115)∗
Observations 453 453 453
R2 0.06 0.07 0.42
Note: All regressions include country ﬁxed effects.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*Signiﬁcant at 10%. **Signiﬁcant at 5%. ***Signiﬁcant at 1%.
On the other hand, when we turn to government consumption in Table 4,
everything becomes insigniﬁcant.
Lookingattheothercomponentsofgovernmentspending,ABMﬁnd:(a)that
countercyclical defense spending is growth-enhancing at low levels of ﬁnancial
development (negative signiﬁcant direct coefﬁcient with or without year ﬁxed
effect or linear time trends) but the interaction coefﬁcient is never signiﬁcant;
Table 4. Government consumption.
Growth of GDP per capita
No year effects Linear time trend Year ﬁxed effects
Lag(procyclicality of −0.005 −0.005 0.007
government consumption) (0.028)( 0.027)( 0.021)
Lag(private credit/GDP) −0.006 −0.008 −0.006
(0.008)( 0.008)( 0.006)
Lag(procyclicality of −0.008 −0.007 −0.004
government consumption
∗private credit/GDP) (0.032)( 0.032)( 0.023)
Relative GDP per capita 0.002 0.028 0.028
(0.004)( 0.013)∗∗ (0.022)
Year 0.001
(0.001)∗∗
Constant 0.037 −2.101 0.168
(0.017)∗∗ (1.000)∗∗ (0.116)
Observations 453 453 453
R2 0.05 0.06 0.41
Note: All regressions include country ﬁxed effects.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*Signiﬁcant at 10%. **Signiﬁcant at 5%. ***Signiﬁcant at 1%.“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 308 — #40
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Table 5. Money supply (M2/GDP).
Growth of GDP per capita
Countiy ﬁxed effects Year ﬁxed effects Country and year ﬁxed effects
Lag(procyclicality of 0.001 −0.005 −0.003
M2/GPD) (0.004)( 0.003)∗ (0.004)
Lag(private credit/GDP) −0.006 −0.002 −0.008
(0.007)( 0.002)( 0.006)
Lag(procyclicality of 0.001 0.007 0.005
M2/GDP
∗private credit/GDP) (0.004)( 0.002)∗∗∗ (0.003)
Relative GDP per capita 0.003 0.001 0.029
(0.005)( 0.001)( 0.019)
Constant 0.038 0.028 0.172
(0.019)∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.099)∗
Observations 458 458 458
R2 0.06 0.37 0.41
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*Signiﬁcant at 10%. **Signiﬁcant at 5%. ***Signiﬁcant at 1%.
(b) that the coefﬁcients for social security are insigniﬁcant (apart from the inter-
action coefﬁcient in the regression with year ﬁxed effects, which is signiﬁcant at
the 10%); and (c) that the direct and interaction coefﬁcients for direct subsidies
to private enterprises are highly signiﬁcant in the regression controlling for year
ﬁxedeffects,stillsigniﬁcantintheregressionnotcontrollingforyearﬁxedeffects
orlineartimetrend,butnotsigniﬁcantintheregressioncontrollingforlineartime
trend only. All these regressions control for country ﬁxed effects.
So far, we have concentrated on budgetary policy. But one could as well
perform similar exercises with variables such as the M2/GDP ratio also used by
Easterly (2005) or short-term real interest rates which are also linked to monetary
policy. For the purpose of this lecture, we have looked at the former, and the
second-stage regression is summarized in Table 5.
Unlikeforbudgetaryvariables,thecoefﬁcientsarenotverysigniﬁcantexcept
in the regression where one controls for linear time trends; the regression where
one controls for year ﬁxed effects shows an interaction coefﬁcient which is sig-
niﬁcant at the 15%. Thus there is something to having a countercyclical M2/GDP
ratio at lower levels of ﬁnancial development, but nothing as signiﬁcant as the
effect of countercyclical government investment for example.
Finally, what can we say about the interplay between countercyclical
budgetary policies and structural reforms such as product or labor market lib-
eralization which we analyzed separately in Section 3? Table 6 shows that the
two are complementary: Namely, a higher degree of product or labor market
liberalization increases the positive growth impact of countercyclical budgetary
policy. A plausible explanation for such complementarity is that government
support during a recession, is useful only to the extent that it helps ﬁrms main-
tain long-term innovative investments aimed at entering a new market or a new“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 309 — #41
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Table 6. Product market liberalization.
Growth of GDP per capita
Year ﬁxed effects Country and year ﬁxed effects
Procyclicality of −0.048 −0.033
public investment (0.025)∗ (0.047)
Product market −0.011 0.002
liberalization (0.008)( 0.019)
Procyclicality of 0.126 0.134
public investment ∗product
market liberalization (0.057)∗∗ (0.077)∗
Constant 0.024 0.035
(0.003)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗
Observations 352 352
R2 0.33 0.39
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*Signiﬁcant at 10%. **Signiﬁcant at 5%. ***Signiﬁcant at 1%.
activity or at improving management methods. However, high entry costs or high
labor mobility costs will reduce ﬁrms’ ability to enter those new activities or
to hire employees for the new tasks, with or without government support. This
ﬁndinggoescountertoacommonviewwherebytheimplementationofstructural
reformswouldreducetheneedforpro-activemacroeconomicpoliciestoenhance
growth.
5.4. Back to Europe versus the US
A natural conclusion from the analysis in this section is that Europe should
have budgetary (and to a lesser extent, monetary) policies that are more coun-
tercyclical, or at least as much countercyclical, than that in the US given that
the US are more ﬁnancially developed than the EU. Indeed, the ratio of pri-
vate credit to GDP in the EU is equal 0.76 against 1.32 in the US, and this
difference abstracts from differences in stock market and venture capital mar-
ket development, both markets are also far more developed in the US than in
the EU. However, as argued by Aghion, Cohen, and Pisani-Ferry (2005), both
the structural deﬁcit and the real interest rates vary much less over time in the
Eurozone than in the US. Our analysis suggests that the absence of an active (or
reactive)macropolicyintheEurozoneisapotentialsourceofgrowthdeﬁcitinthis
region.
6. Conclusion
In this lecture, we have argued that the Schumpeterian paradigm provides
a unifying framework for thinking about and designing appropriate (context-
dependent) growth policy. In particular, the paradigm produces precise testable“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 310 — #42
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predictions as to how growth-maximizing policies (e.g., competition and entry
policies, the allocation of education funding, or the design of macroeconomic
policies) should vary with a country’s or sector’s distance to the technological
frontier, and/or with the country’s level of ﬁnancial development.
The empirical support we have presented for these predictions implies that
policy does indeed matter for a country’s growth performance even if, as Easterly
(forthcomming) has argued, no linear relationship between policy and growth
can be found in the data once institutions are controlled for. This is because
appropriate growth policies vary with a country’s institutions. For example, the
results reported in Section 5.3 imply that countercyclical macro policy promotes
growth, but mainly in countries with relatively low ﬁnancial development. Such
effects can be detected only by taking into account the nonlinear interactions
predicted by Schumpeterian theory.
We have also emphasized that the separation between (short-run) macroeco-
nomicpolicyandlong-rungrowth,oftenassumedinmacrotextbooksorinpolicy
circles, is theoretically questionable and at odds with cross-country panel regres-
sions; not only does long-run growth respond to ﬁscal or monetary policy over
the cycle, but in addition there is complementarity between the growth effects of
a more countercyclical budgetary policy and those of structural reforms such as
product market or labor market liberalization.
When comparing the Schumpeterian paradigm to the AK or product diver-
sity models of endogenous growth, we have concluded that the former does a
better job at delivering systematic and yet context-dependent policy prescrip-
tions. In particular, the AK model has nothing to say on competition policy,
or on how the composition of education spending can affect growth depend-
ing on distance to the frontier, and also it fails to capture the interplay between
volatility and growth and therefore the potential role for countercyclical macroe-
conomic policies. The product variety model is bound to remain counterfactual
with regard to the effects of competition or ﬁrm exit on growth, and because
it does not capture the notion of distance to the technological frontier it does
not generate appropriate policy prescriptions in areas like competition/entry or
education.
The limitations of AK or neoclassical growth models in generating policy
prescriptions does not imply however that capital accumulation is unimportant
for growth. On the contrary, in Aghion and Howitt (1998, ch. 3) we demonstrated
a complementarity between savings and capital accumulation on the one hand
andgrowth-enhancinginnovationontheother.21 WealsobelievethattheSchum-
peterian paradigm can suggest savings and capital accumulation policies that are
21. A higher savings rate leads to a higher steady-state level of capital per efﬁciency unit of labor,
which in turn increases the proﬁt ﬂow accruing to a successful innovator. This in turn results in
higher innovation incentives and therefore a higher long-run growth rate.“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 311 — #43
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context dependent in a way consistent with the data, and can thereby do better
than AK on its own territory.
The particular story we have in mind is the following. Catching up with the
technological frontier requires a country to attract “know-how,” or technological
spillovers,fromfrontierﬁrmsinmoredevelopedcountries.Importantvehiclesfor
transferring know-how are foreign direct investment and collaborative ventures
between local producers and frontier buyers. However, investment by frontier
ﬁrms in less developed countries requires a good local investment climate, in the
formofmacroeconomicstability,socialpeace,adequateinfrastructure,andsoon.
Theproblemthenisoneofcommitmentonthelocalgovernment’sparttocreating
suchaclimate.Thisinturnrequires(privateand/orpublic)savings.Foracountry
close to the frontier, implementation of frontier technologies is less important
for growth, and therefore savings should also be less important for growth. For a
countryveryfarbelowthefrontier,theﬁxedcostsofsettinguptheappropriateeco-
nomic environment may not be affordable at any savings rate, and typically insti-
tutions are so bad that they override any potential effect of savings, so we should
again observe a low correlation between the savings rate and the growth rate.
A preliminary look at cross-country data conﬁrms this bell-shaped pattern.
Morespeciﬁcally,usingdatafromthePennWorldTableson95countriesbetween
1960 and 2000, we estimated the equation
gi = α + βsi,
where gi is country i’s average growth rate of per capita GDP over the sample
period and si is the country’s average saving rate (total saving over GDP). The
OLS estimate of β, the effect of saving on growth, was highly signiﬁcant when
we used the whole sample; but when we divided countries into three equal-sized
groups depending on distance to the frontier and ran the regression on each group
separately, the estimated effect was signiﬁcant in the middle group but not in the
group closest to or furthest from the frontier.22
Thus, if saving matters for productivity growth it does so in a way consistent
with the idea that implementation becomes less important relative to innovation
as a country gets closer to the technological frontier. The interaction effect is
predictedbytheSchumpeterianparadigmbutcouldnotbeeasilypredictedbythe
AK or product variety model. We believe that this new way of looking at saving
may be useful for the design of growth-enhancing policies in middle-income
countries,forexamplethoseinLatinAmerica,wheresavings(particularlypublic
savings) are low compared to their Asian counterparts. We leave this and many
other open questions on appropriate growth policy for future research.
22. Distance was measured by the sample average value of per-capita GDP. Using the full sample
the estimated value of β was 0.05 with a t-statistic of 5.08, using the middle group it was 0.07 with
t = 3.04, using the group closest to the frontier it was 0.04 with t = 1.38, and using the group
furthest from the frontier it was 0.01 with t = 0.44.“zwu002060318” — 2006/6/27 — page 312 — #44
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